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1.  Introduction: Aggregation of individual preferences into a social preference is a 
major issue in welfare economics. The least that any such aggregation procedure is 
required to guarantee is what is known in the literature as the Pareto principle. The Pareto 
principle says that if a social state is perceived as “no better than” a second social state by 
all individuals and strictly worse than the second by some individual then the second 
social state is socially preferred to the first. The Pareto principle gives rise to the Pareto 
relation in a natural manner: a social state is said to be “Pareto superior to” or “Pareto 
dominate” a second social state if and only if the first is at least as good as the second for 
all individuals and strictly better than the second for some. Had it not been that the Pareto 
relation is possibly incomplete (i.e. there may be social states which are not comparable 
via the Pareto relation) the problem of preference aggregation would have been 
practically non-existent. If the Pareto relation were always complete then we could 
identify social preferences with the Pareto relation. However, since the Pareto relation 
usually admits non-comparable pairs the problem of preference aggregation arises. Why 
do we insist on complete comparability of all pairs of social states for an aggregation 
rule? This is done simply to ensure that undominated choices from a set of social states 
are indeed the socially “best” choices from the same set of social states. This result 
appears in Sen [1970] 
Most of preference aggregation theory is concerned with individual preferences which 
are extremely well-behaved, i.e. reflexive, transitive and connected. Such individual 
preferences are known as orderings. A consequence of individual preferences being 
orderings is that the Pareto relation becomes transitive. However there is little 
justification in economics for individuals to exhibit the kind of consistency that 
aggregation theory demands. It is important that a decision maker is capable of taking 
decisions when confronted with a choice problem. For decision making to be possible it 
is not necessary that preferences be transitive. It is well known that a necessary and 
sufficient condition for decision making from finite sets of alternatives to be possible is 
that the preference of the decision maker is acyclic. Further if all individuals have acyclic 
preferences then the Pareto relation (interpreted in the “strong” sense and discussed later) 
is acyclic and not necessarily transitive.      
Conventional aggregation theory also requires that the social preference that is derived 
from individual preferences is an ordering over social states. Once again for social 
decision making acyclicity rather than transitivity is the required feature. Unlike the 
problems that social choice theory has to contend with when individual and social 
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preferences are assumed to be orderings, there are fewer problems and meaningful 
aggregation procedures when social preferences are required to be merely acyclic. A 
good exposition of the aggregation theory when social welfare is assumed to be acyclic 
can be found in Moulin (1988). More up-to-date results can be found in Banks (1995). 
There are two very important questions that arise in the context of Pareto relations and 
social welfare relations. The first question is the following: Is the set of all Pareto optimal 
social states the same as the set of social states chosen by some Pareto consistent social 
welfare relation? The second question in the same context is: How well do Pareto 
consistent approximations of a social welfare relation perform in choosing the social 
states that a given Pareto consistent social welfare relation would?  
Before we proceed to answer these two questions it is important to point out that the set 
of all Pareto relations when individual preferences are assumed to be reflexive and 
acyclic is identical to the set of all reflexive and acyclic binary relations. To see this note 
that if all individual preferences are reflexive then the Pareto relation is clearly reflexive. 
Further if we interpret Pareto superiority in the strong sense (i.e. a social state is 
(strongly) Pareto superior to a second only if all individuals prefer the first to the second) 
then the existence of a Pareto preference cycle would have to coincide with the same 
preference cycle arising for each individual separately, the latter being ruled out if 
individual preferences are acyclic. Thus acyclicity of individual preferences implies 
acyclicity of the Pareto relation. On the other hand given any reflexive and acyclic binary 
relation, we can interpret that as the Pareto relation of a society where every individual’s 
preference coincides with the given relation. 
Of the two questions mentioned above, the first question has been dealt with by Banerjee 
and Pattanaik (1996) in the case when the Pareto relation is assumed to be reflexive and 
transitive and social welfare is an ordering. In such an environment they show that the set 
of all Pareto optimal social states does indeed coincide with the set of all social states 
chosen by Pareto consistent social welfare orderings. In this paper we show that such an 
identity prevails if the Pareto relation, as well as all Pareto consistent social welfare 
relations is acyclic. The proof of this result is much simpler than the corresponding proof 
in Banerjee and Pattanaik (1996). This is largely because it is easy to show that given any 
reflexive and acyclic binary relation it is possible to extend it to a connected, reflexive 
and acyclic binary relation by simply including all non-comparable pairs along with the 
given relation. A consequence of our result and that of Banerjee and Pattanaik (1996) is 
that if the Pareto relation is transitive then the set of all social states chosen by social 
welfare orderings is the same as the set of all social states chosen by acyclic social 
welfare relations.  
The second question that we posed has been discussed by Suzumura (1999) in a setting 
similar to the one in Banerjee and Pattanaik (1996). In Suzumura (1999) it is shown that 
the social states chosen by a Pareto consistent social welfare relation coincides with the 
set of all social states that are chosen by every binary relation that strictly includes the 
Pareto relation and is strictly included in the social welfare relation. The requirement that 
the “approximate” relations are strictly included in the given social welfare relation is to 
ensure that the result is non-trivial. The requirement that the “approximate” relations 
strictly include the Pareto relation is to ensure the veracity of the assertion. However, 
these strict inclusions require the assumption that the set of such approximations is non-
empty. Our corresponding result tells a similar story when the Pareto relation and the 
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Pareto consistent social welfare relation is acyclic. We need to make the same non-
emptiness(“non-triviality”) assumption that appears in Suzumura (1999). Further our 
proof is almost identical to the proof of the corresponding result (called “Recoverabilty 
Theorem”) in Suzumura (1999). Since transitive binary relations are always acyclic, the 
Recoverability theorem follows from our second theorem. 
It is hoped that the extensions of existing results for social welfare orderings to the 
situation where we merely require acyclicity of social welfare relations will be a small 
but fruitful step towards broadening the horizons of “applicable” welfare economics.    
 
2.  The Model: Let X be a non-empty finite set of social states and <X> the set of all 
non-empty subsets of X.  
A binary relation Q on X is a subset of X×X; if (x,y)∈Q, we often represent it as xQy.  
A binary relation Q is said to be reflexive if for all x∈X it is the case that xQx; it is said to 
be connected if for all x,y∈X with x ≠ y it is the case that either xQy or yQx. 
Given a binary relation Q, its asymmetric part denoted P(Q) is the binary relation 
{(x,y)∈Q: (y,x)∉Q}; its symmetric part denoted I(Q) is the binary relation {(x,y)∈Q: 
(y,x)∈Q}. 
Given a binary relation Q a P(Q)-cycle is a non-empty finite subset set {x1, x2,…, xK}of 
X for some positive integer K > 1 such that: (i) xi P(Q)xi+1 for i = 1,…, K-1; (ii) 
xKP(Q)x1.  
A binary relation Q is said to be acyclic if it does not have a P(Q)-cycle. 
Given a binary relation Q and S∈<X>, let M(S,Q) = {x∈S: for all y∈S it is the case that 
(y,x)∉P(Q)}. M(S,Q) is said to be the set of  Q-undominated social states in S. 
It is well known that the set of Q- undominated social states in S is non-empty for all 
S∈<X> if and only if Q is acyclic. 
If Q is reflexive and connected then for all S∈<X>: M(S,Q) = {x∈S: for all y∈S it is the 
case that xQy}, where the latter set is called the set of Q-best alternatives (social states) in 
S. This result can be found in Sen [1970] for instance. 
A binary relation Q' is said to extend (or be an extension of) a binary relation Q if Q ⊂ Q' 
and P(Q) ⊂ P(Q'). In such a situation Q is said to be a sub-relation of Q'. 
Given a binary relation Q let E (Q) denote the set of all reflexive, connected and acyclic 
binary relations that extend Q. 
For the purpose of this paper a reflexive and acyclic binary relation will be called a 
Pareto relation.  
In what follows we will assume that we are given a Pareto relation R0. 
Further, for the purpose of this paper any reflexive, connected and acyclic binary relation 
that extends R0 will be referred to as a Paretian Social Welfare Relation. 
Let ∆(X) = {(x,x): x∈X}. ∆(X) is called the diagonal of X. A binary relation is reflexive 
if and only if it contains ∆(X). 
 
3.  Reflexive, connected and acyclic extensions: The following proposition is 
significant for the purposes of this paper. 
 
Proposition 1: Given a binary relation Q, E (Q) is nonempty if and only if Q is acyclic. 
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Proof: First suppose E (Q) is nonempty. Then since for all Q'∈ E (Q) it is the case that 
P(Q) ⊂ P(Q') it follows that any P(Q)-cycle is a P(Q')-cycle for all such Q'. If Q'∈ E (Q) 
then there are no P(Q')-cycles. Hence the non-emptiness of E (Q) implies the absence of 
P(Q)-cycles. Thus Q must be acyclic. 
Now suppose Q is acyclic. If Q∈ E (Q) we are done. If not then the set N(Q) ≡ 
{(x,y)∈X×X: (x,y)∉Q & (y,x)∉Q} is non-empty. Note if (x,y)∈N(Q) then so does (y,x). 
Further if (x,x)∉Q for some x∈X, then (x,x)∈N(Q). 
Let Q0 = Q∪N(Q). Clearly xI(Q0)y for all (x,y)∈N(Q) and Q0 is reflexive as well as 
connected. 
Towards a contradiction suppose there is a P(Q0)-cycle. Then for some positive integer K 
> 1 there exists a non-empty finite subset {x1,…,xK}of X such that: (i) xi P(Q0)xi+1 for i = 
1,…, K-1; (ii) xKP(Q0)x1. 
But this implies (i) xi P(Q)xi+1 for i = 1,…, K-1; (ii) xKP(Q)x1, giving rise to a P(Q)-cycle 
and contradicting the acyclicity of Q. 
Thus Q0∈ E (Q), i.e. E (Q) is non-empty. Q.E.D. 
 
We can use proposition 1 to prove the following result which has interesting 
consequences for Paretian social welfare relations. 
 
Proposition 2: Let Q be a binary relation. Then for all S∈<X> it is the case that M(S,Q) 
= U
)(
),(
QER
RSM
∈
if and only if Q is acyclic. 
 
Proof: First suppose that for all S∈<X> it is the case that M(S,Q) = U
)(
),(
QER
RSM
∈
. 
Towards a contradiction suppose that Q is not acyclic. Then by proposition 1, E (Q) is 
empty. 
Thus U
)(
),(
QER
RSM
∈
 is empty for all S∈<X> although for all x∈X, it is the case that M({x, 
Q) = {x}≠ φ, leading to a violation of the assumed equality. Thus Q is acyclic. 
Now suppose Q is acyclic. By proposition 1, E (Q) is non-empty.      
Let S∈<X>. Suppose x∈ U
)(
),(
QER
RSM
∈
. Towards a contradiction suppose there exists 
y∈S such that yP(Q)x. Thus yP(R)x for all R∈ E (Q) contradicting x∈ U
)(
),(
QER
RSM
∈
. 
Thus x∈M(S,Q). Thus U
)(
),(
QER
RSM
∈
⊂ M(S,Q). 
Now suppose x∈M(S,Q).  
As in the proof of proposition 1, let N(Q) ≡ {(w,z)∈X×X: (w,z)∉Q & (z,w)∉Q}. 
Let Q' = Q∪N(Q). Clearly Q'∈ E (Q) and P(Q') = P(Q). 
Thus x∈M(S,Q'), i.e. x∈ U
)(
),(
QER
RSM
∈
. 
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Thus M(S,Q) ⊂ U
)(
),(
QER
RSM
∈
. 
Combining the two inclusions we get M(S, Q) = U
)(
),(
QER
RSM
∈
. Q.E.D. 
Let E 0 denote E (R0). By proposition 1, E 0 is non-empty, i.e. the set of Paretian social 
welfare relations is non-empty. By proposition 2 we obtain the following theorem which 
is similar to a corresponding result available in Banerjee and Patttanaik [1996].  
 
Theorem 1: For all S∈<X>: M(S, R0) = U
0
),(
ER
RSM
∈
. 
Theorem 1 says that that the set of Pareto optimal social states coincides with the set of 
social states that are chosen by some Paretian social welfare relation. 
 
4.  Approximating a Paretian social welfare relation: Now suppose as in Suzumura 
[1999] that R is a given Paretian social welfare relation. Unlike Suzumura [1999] 
transitivity or even consistency of binary relations plays no role in our analysis. Given a 
set of social states, it is easy to see that the R-undominated social states (or the social 
choice set) from S will be Pareto optimal for S(i.e. undominated by the Pareto relation in 
S). The question that we are interested in is the following: what is the precise structure of 
the social choice set from S in terms of reflexive and acyclic binary relations that satisfies 
the Pareto principle and approximates R, i.e. is an extension of R0 and a sub-relation of 
R? 
Let Θ(R0, R) = {Q⊂X×X: R0⊂⊂ Q ⊂⊂ R and P(R0)⊂ P(Q) ⊂ P(R)}. 
Thus if Q∈Θ(R0, R) then Q is reflexive (since R0 is) and acyclic (since R is).  
Neither R0 nor R belongs to Θ(R0, R) since we require each binary relation in Θ(R0, R) to 
be a strict superset of R0 and a strict subset of R. 
The remarkable fact is that the following result similar to the “Recoverability” theorem in 
Suzumura [1999] holds in this acyclic scenario. 
 
Theorem 2: Suppose Θ(R0, R) is non-empty. Then for all S∈<X>: M(S,R) = 
I
),( 0
),(
RRQ
QSM
Θ∈
. 
Proof: Let S∈<X>. 
First suppose x∈M(S,R). Thus for all y∈S it is the case that (y,x)∉P(R). 
Towards a contradiction suppose there exists Q'∈Θ(R0, R) such that x∉M(S,Q').  
Thus there exists y∈S such that yP(Q')x. 
Since P(Q') ⊂ P(R) we get that yP(R)x contradicting x∈M(S,R). 
Thus x∈ I
),( 0
),(
RRQ
QSM
Θ∈
. 
Hence M(S,R) ⊂ I
),( 0
),(
RRQ
QSM
Θ∈
. 
Now suppose x∈ I
),( 0
),(
RRQ
QSM
Θ∈
.  
Towards a contradiction suppose x∉M(S,R). 
Thus there exists y∈S such that yP(R)x. However for all Q∈Θ(R0, R) it is the case that 
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(y,x)∉P(Q). 
Consider Q∪{(y,x)} for Q∈Θ(R0, R). 
Suppose for some Q0 there exists a positive integer K>1 and a non-empty subset 
{x1,…,xK} such that: (i) x1 = x, xK = y; (ii) xiP(Q0)xi+1 for i = 1,…,K-1. 
Then xiP(R)xi+1 for i = 1,…,K-1. This combined with yP(R)x contradicts the acyclicity of 
R. 
Hence since Q0 is acyclic Q0∪{(y,x)} is acyclic. 
If xQ0y, then it must be the case that xRy contradicting yP(R)x. 
Thus for no Q0∈Θ(R0, R) is it the case that xQ0y. 
Thus yP(Q0∪{(y,x)})x. 
Since Q0 ⊂ R, P(Q0) ⊂ P(R) and yP(R)x, we get that R extends Q0∪{(y,x)}. 
Further R0⊂ Q0∪{(y,x)} and P(R0) ⊂ P(Q0) ⊂P(Q0∪{(y,x)}). 
If Q0∪{(y,x)}⊂⊂R, then Q0∪{(y,x)}∈Θ(R0, R). 
But x∉M(S, Q0∪{(y,x)}) contradicting x∈ I
),( 0
),(
RRQ
QSM
Θ∈
. 
Hence it must be the case that Q∪{(y,x)}= R for all Q∈Θ(R0, R). 
Thus there exists a unique Q* such that Θ(R0, R) = {Q*}. 
Since R0 ⊂⊂Q*, there exists (w,z)∈Q*\R0. 
For reasons identical to those that lead to Q0∪{(y,x)}∈Θ(R0, R) we get that both 
R0∪{(y,x)} and R0∪{(w,z)} belong to Θ(R0, R) contradicting that Θ(R0, R) is a 
singleton. 
Thus x∈M(S,R). 
Thus I
),( 0
),(
RRQ
QSM
Θ∈
⊂ M(S,R). 
Combining the two inclusions we get that I
),( 0
),(
RRQ
QSM
Θ∈
= M(S,R). Q.E.D.   
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